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THE VIRTUES OF GOD AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS
Linda Zagzebski

In this paper I give a theological foundation to a radical type of virtue ethics I
call motivation-based. In motivation-based virtue theory all moral concepts are
derivative from the concept of a good motive, the most basic component of a
virtue, where what I mean by a motive is an emotion that initiates and directs
action towards an end. Here I give a foundation to motivation-based virtue theory by making the motivations of one person in particular the ultimate foundation of al\ moral value, and that person is God. The theory is structurally parallel to Divine Command Theory, but has a number of advantages over DC theory without the well-known problems. In particular, DM theory does not face a
dilemma parallel to the famous Euthyphro problem, nor does it have any difficulty answering the question whether God could make cruelty morally right.
Unlike DC theory, it explains the importance of Christology in Christian ethics,
and it has the advantage of providing a unitary account of all evaluative properties, divine and human. I call the theory Divine Motivation Theory.

"Nothing will be called good except in so far as it has a certain
likeness of the divine goodness." sec I. 40. 326.
1. The foundations of virtue ethics

A moral theory is an abstract structure that aims to simplify, systematize, and justify our moral practices and beliefs. The shape of the structure itself is typically either foundationalist or coherentist,. although
well-known problems with both of these structures within epistemology
may lead some ethicists to seek an alternative. A more radical approach
is to give up the very idea of a moral theory, and virtue ethicists have
been among the most prominent of the anti-theorists.' Contemporary
virtue ethics, then, is often portrayed as not only an alternative to actbased theories, but as an alternative to theorv itself.
Virtue ethicists are particularly skeptical ~about foundationalist moral
theory. Aretaic theories deriving from Aristotle or Aquinas make the
foundational moral concept eudaimonia, or human flourishing, where
eudaimonia is derivative from or dependent upon the allegedly nonmoral concept of human nature. 2 But many contemporary ethicists have
despaired of ever giving a clear and plausible account of eudaimonia,
much less one that has universal applicability, and the concept of nature
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has been attacked throughout the modern era on the grounds that it
depends upon an outdated biology. Nonetheless, the concept of human
nature has survived, if somewhat bruised,' and even eudaimonia has survived, although typically without the pretense of being foundational in
the sense I mean here. 4 So skepticism about the ability of virtue ethics to
even get started has kept many a contemporary philosopher away from
it. And virtue theorists themselves are prone to this skepticism. So when
virtue ethics entered a renaissance in the last two decades, it did so without most of the theoretical trappings of modern theories.
I am convinced that if virtue ethics is ever to be the equal rival of
deontological and consequentialist ethics, it should have a form that is
purely theoretical, one that addresses such basic issues as whether moral
properties are grounded in non-moral properties, whether moral judgments have a truth value, where morality gets its authority, how the
moral properties of persons, acts, and states of affairs are related to each
other, and many others.s I would not deny that it is desirable to have
forms of virtue ethics that ignore these theoretical issues, and we probably cannot do both at the same time. But I believe that the human need
to theorize is a powerful one. We want to understand the moral world
as well as the natural world and, indeed, to understand the relation
between the two. For Christians there is also the need to understand the
relation between the moral world and the supernatural world. The
reliance of the moral world on God puts constraints on the way we
answer the deep questions just mentioned, although, as far as I can tell,
belief in the Christian God puts no special constraint on whether the theory is de ontological, consequentialist, aretaic, or some alternative, nor
on whether the structure of the theory is foundationalist, coherentist, or
some alternative. But Christian philosophers have traditionally agreed
that in some sense God is the foundation of moral value, and that makes
the search for a foundationalist structure a natural one even though I see
no reason to think that a belief in moral foundationalism is a requirement of Christianity.
In this paper I want to exhibit one way to structure a virtue ethics
with a theological foundation; in fact, the theological foundation is an
extension of virtue theory to God himself. It is, then, a divine virtue theory. In other work I have outlined a strong form of virtue ethics I call
motivation-based." This theory makes all moral concepts derivative from
the concept of a good motive, the most basic component of a virtue,
where what I mean by a motive is an emotion that initiates and directs
action towards an end. In outlining that theory I left unanswered the
important question of what makes a motive a good one. In this paper I
will give motivation-based virtue theory a theological foundation by
making the motivations of one person in particular the ultimate foundation of all moral value, and that person is God. I call the theory Divine
Motivation Theory.
Divine Motivation Theory has the following structure: The motivational states of God are ontologically and explanatorily the basis for all
moral properties. God's motives are perfectly good and human motives
are good in so far as they are similar to the divine motives as those
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motives would be expressed in finite and embodied beings. Like motivation-based virtue theory, all moral properties, including the moral properties of persons, acts and states of affairs, are grounded in their relation
to good motives, but they are more specifically grounded in their relation to the motives of a perfect being whose nature is the metaphysical
foundation of all value. The theory is structurally parallel to Divine
Command Theory, but it has many advantages over that theory while
avoiding the disadvantages.

II. The theory without the foundation: Motivation-based virtue theory
In any foundationalist moral theory there is something that is good in
the most basic way. If the goodness of something is really foundational,
it cannot be justified or explained by the goodness of something else,
and it is usually claimed that it needs no justification or explanation.
Theorists almost always hedge this claim, however, and try to think of
some way of justifying what the theory says cannot be justified, as Mill
does in attempting to justify the goodness of pleasure in chap. 4 of
Utilitarianism. Even Aristotle (who may not be intending to present a
foundationalist structure anyway), appeals to common belief in justifying his claim that eudaimonia is the ultimate good in Book I of the
Nicomachean Ethics. Kant uses a transcendental argument to defend the
primacy of the Categorical Imperative. And Sidgwick reaches his
allegedly self-evident moral principles from reflection upon moral intuition in Methods of Ethics.
What I mean by a pure virtue theory is one in which the concept of a
good human trait (a virtue) is logically prior to the concept of a right act,
and in the strongest form, the concept of a virtue is also prior to the concept of a good state of affairs. The theory I will outline here is an
instance of the strongest form of pure virtue theory, making all evaluative concepts logically dependent upon the concept of a virtue- more
specifically, on the most basic component of a virtue, a motivation. In
this section I will outline the structure of a motivation-based virtue theory only briefly since my principal interest in this paper is to show how a
theological foundation can be given for this theory that should be attractive to the Christian philosopher. That task will be left for sections Ill-V.
I propose that moral properties presuppose the existence of persons.
They are either properties of persons or their acts, or they are derivative
from the properties of persons, e.g., the properties of personal creations- social institutions, practices, laws, etc? It is common in ethics to
think of the will as the center of the moral self, and for this reason, moral
properties are often thought to be most fundamentally properties of the
will. The primacy of the will as the bearer of moral value emerged gradually throughout the medieval period, reaching its clearest expression
during that period in the work of Duns Scotus, and, of course, reaching
its zenith in the modern period in Kant's famous claim that there is
nothing good without qualification but a good will. My proposal is to
retain the focus of moral evaluation on the person, but to shift it away
from the will, both when we are talking about God and when we are
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talking about human beings, and to focus instead on emotion.
I suggest that moral properties in the primary sense attach to emotions. Emotions are good or bad in themselves; they do not derive their
goodness or badness from their relation to anything else that is good or
bad. In particular, they are not good or bad in virtue of their relationship
to the states of affairs which are their intentional objects or the states of
affairs which produce them. For example, it is bad to take delight in the
misfortune of others or to enjoy the sight of animals in pain, even when
these emotions never motivate the agent to act on them. And the badness of these emotions is not derivative from the badness of the pain of
animals or the misfortune of others. I will not give an account of the
state of emotion here, but it suffices for the purposes of this paper to say
that an emotion has a cognitive component as well as a feeling component. The cognitive component mayor may not be as fully formed as a
belief or a judgment, although it always involves taking or supposing or
imagining some portion of the world to be a certain way8- e.g., threatening, exciting, boring, pitiful, contemptible, etc. The feeling component
i.1Ccompanies seeing something as threatening, exciting, contemptible.
The agent feels threatened by something seen as threatening, feels excited by something seen as exciting, feels contemptuous of something seen
as contemptible, and so on.
The cognitive aspect of emotion suggests that emotions have intentional objects, which is to say, a person is afraid of something, is angry at
someone, is excited about something, loves someone, and so on, and some
writers have taken the intentionality of emotion to be a characteristic
distinguishing emotions from similar psychic states such as moods or
pure feelings. I am inclined to accept this position, although it is not critical for the thesis of this paper.
A motive is an emotion that initiates, sustains, and directs action
towards an end. Not all motives are emotions since some motives are
almost purely physiological, such as the motives of hunger, thirst, or
fatigue, and for this reason these states are sometimes called "drives".
But the motives that have foundational ethical significance are emotions.
It is also possible that not all emotions are motivating since some emotions may be purely passive, which is why emotions were formerly
called "passions". Examples of passive emotions might include joy, sadness, tranquillity, and the enjoyment of beauty. But even these emotions
probably can motivate in certain circumstances. It is usual to call an
emotion a motive only when it actually operates to motivate on a particular occasion. But when an emotion that sometimes motivates does not
operate to motivate at a particular time, it retains its motivational potential. So not all motives are emotions, but the morally significant ones are
emotions, and most, if not all, emotions are or can be motives. That is,
they have potential motivational force. 9
Motives tend to be persistent and become dispositions, at which point
they become components of enduring traits of character- virtues or
vices. Each virtue has a motivational component which is the disposition
to have an action-guiding emotion characteristic of the particular virtue.
The virtuous person is disposed to perform acts motivated by such an
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emotion. So a person with the virtue of benevolence is disposed to act in
ways motivated by the emotion of benevolence; a person with the virtue
of courage is disposed to act in ways motivated by the distinctive emotion underlying the behavior of those who face danger when they judge
it to be necessary to obtain a greater good; a person with the virtue of
justice is disposed to act in ways expressing an attitude of equal respect
for the humanity of others, and so on.HI
A virtue also has a success component which is a component of reliability in reaching the end of the motivational component of the virtue.
Some virtuous motives aim at producing a state of affairs of a certain
kind. The state of affairs may either be internal to the agent or external
to the agent. Other virtuous motives aim to express the emotion of the
agent. Temperance is an example of a virtue whose motivational component aims at producing a state within the agent, whereas fairness is a
virtue whose motivational component aims at producing a state of
affairs external to the agent. Empathy and gratitude are examples of
virtues whose motivational components aim at expressing the agent's
emotional state. Successfully achieving the end of a virtuous motive,
then, sometimes amounts to bringing about a state of affairs completely
distinct from the motivating emotion, and sometimes success is achieved
by merely expressing the emotion itself.
Some human motivations are good and others are bad. Good human
motivations are components of virtues; bad human motivations are components of vices. If a human motive is a good one, reliable success in
achieving its end is also a good thing. The goodness of the virtuous end
is derivative from the goodness of the motive, not the other way around.
The combination of a good human motivation with reliable success in
reaching its end is a good human trait- a virtue. A vice is the combination of a bad human motivation with reliable success in reaching the end
of the bad motivation.
The evaluative properties of acts are derivative from the evaluative
properties of persons. Roughly, a right (permissible) act is an act a virtuous person might do. That is, it is not the case that she would not do it.lI
A wrong act is an act a virtuous person characteristically would not do.
Vicious persons characteristically perform wrong acts, but so do persons
who are neither vicious nor virtuous, and virtuous persons also may
perform wrong acts, but uncharacteristically. A moral duty is an act a
virtuous person characteristically would do. A virtuous act is one that
expresses the motivational component of the virtue. For example, a compassionate act is one that expresses the motivation of compassion. It is
an act in which the agent is motivated by compassion and acts with the
intention of reaching the motivational end of compassion, the alleviation
of the suffering of someone else. In the case of certain virtues, most especially justice, acts expressing the virtue are all moral duties. In the case
of other virtues (e.g., compassion, kindness, mercy) many acts express
the virtue but are not moral dutiesY
The moral properties of states of affairs can also be defined in terms of
good and bad motivations. Roughly, a good state of affairs is one that is the
end of a good motive. A bad state of affairs is one that is the end of a bad
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motive.13 Goodness and badness of motives are more fundamental than
goodness and badness of states of affairs. This is a generalization of the point
that all moral value derives from a personal God. (Of course, non-moral
value does also, but the subject of this paper is moral value). My conjecture is
that the nature of moral value is such that it must derive from persons and
more particularly, from the motivational states of persons. This view on the
relation between the value of a motive and the value of the state of affairs at
which it aims reverses the more usual view that the motive to bring about a
bad state of affairs such as pain in others is bad because pain is a bad thing.
Instead, my suggestion is that pain is a bad thing in the morally relevant
sense because of the badness of the motive to bring it about. That motive is
an emotional state that is bad in a sense that does not derive from the badness of anything other than other motives (the motives of God).
In motivation-based virtue theory there is a logical connection
between the two senses of good- the admirable and the desirable, with
the latter deriving from the former. Similarly, there is a logical connection between two senses of bad- the despicable and the undesirable. 11
Intuitively the distinction between the two senses of good and bad can
be important since we think there is a fundamental difference between
the sense in which injustice is bad and the sense in which pain is bad, or
the sense in which compassion is good and the sense in which tranquillity is good. And this difference is not simply the difference between
moral and non-moral good and bad because those things that are good
or bad in the sense of desirable/undesirable can have moral significance.
If so, it would be very peculiar if the two senses of good and bad just
distinguished were unconnected, and I am proposing that they are not.
The good in the most fundamental sense of good is the admirable, and
the bad in the most fundamental sense of bad is the despicable. The
good in the sense of desirable is defined in terms of what is desired by
admirable people, while the bad in the sense of undesirable is what
admirable people desire to prevent or to eliminate.];
In motivation-based virtue theory motives are good or bad in the
most fundamental sense of good or bad. But what makes a motive good?
One way we might answer this question is to borrow a suggestion from
Plato in the Republic, where Socrates states that a good (just) person is
one whose soul is in harmony. The idea would be that motives (emotions) are good when they integrate into a harmonious whole. This suggestion is worth pursuing, but the answer I want to give here is a theological one. Moral value is constituted by a harmony with the divine, not
just a harmony within the soul. Human motives are good in so far as
they are like God's motives. Since motives are emotions, this means that
God must have emotions, a controversial position in Christian theology,
although I will argue that the theory can stand without the claim that
the states in God which are the counterparts of human emotions are also
emotions. In any case, human virtues are modeled on the virtues of God.
In humans virtues are finite representations of the traits of a perfect
God. Since the gap between God and ourselves is infinite, it may seem to
be hopelessly impractical, even if theologically and metaphysically
desirable, to model our moral traits on God in this way. But we have
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Christ incarnate as our archetype. What I will propose in what follows is
a way to give the traditional Christian idea of ethics as the imitation of
Christ a theoretical structure.

III. The virtues of God
There are many accounts of virtue in the history of ethics, but all
accounts agree that virtues are excellences; they are good personal traits.
If we assume that the goodness of God is the metaphysical ground of all
value, it is natural to ask whether God has virtues. It may seem that the
answer is no, and in good Thomistic fashion I will start with the objections to the thesis before proceeding to argue that God does have virtues,
and that the divine virtues include both a motivational component and a
success component as described in section II. More importantly, the
divine virtues are not simply pale imitations of the more robust and richly nuanced traits of embodied and encultured beings. The relationship
between divine and human virtues is, in fact, the reverse: Human virtues
are pale imitations of the divine virtues. Admittedly we cannot really
grasp perfection and we tend to find imperfection more interesting, perhaps because it admits of more variety than perfection and we find that
thinking about perfection is too demanding a task since our experience is
limited to the imperfect. Nonetheless, I believe that God is the only being
who is virtuous in a pure and unqualified sense. As Aquinas says, all
moral properties are attributed primarily to God and only analogously to
humans. I believe that this includes the virtues and the primary component of virtue, a motivation.
In giving the following objections I will work with the high metaphysical view of God's nature that was developed in the medieval period and has its most subtle and penetrating expression in the thought of
Aquinas. I will, however, propose a modification of that view since I
submit that God has emotions.
Objection 1: God cannot have a virtue if a virtue includes a motivational component and a motive is an emotional state since God has no
emotions. God cannot have emotions since (i) emotions involve the
sense appetite and require a body, but God has no body or sensory
appetite, and (ii) emotions are passions, ways of being acted upon, and
that implies imperfection, but God is perfect and, hence, impassible.
Objection 2: Virtues are habits that involve overcoming contrary
temptations and take time to develop, so they only make sense when
attributed to imperfect beings who undergo change. But God does not
develop his traits and has no contrary temptations; he is perfect and
unchangeable.
Objection 3: Virtues are traditionally explained teleologically by reference to the natural end of a thing of a certain kind, an end that is not
already actualized. This means that virtue presupposes potency. The
virtues are goods for a thing as a member of a natural kind. But God is
not lacking anything and has no potency, nor does God belong to a natural kind. Furthermore, it's hard to see how anything could be good for
God.
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Objection 4: Virtues in their richer and more interesting forms are
socially and culturally conditioned. Honesty in parts of Asia is very different from honesty in the US. even when we consider only the later
twentieth century. Cultural differences are even greater when we look at
other historical periods. The practical usefulness of the concept of virtue
depends upon our learning these richer, culture-dependent concepts.
But it is hard to see how the virtues of God could serve such a practical
purpose, even assuming that God does have virtues. We learn virtues by
learning social practices, not by learning theology.
Virtues are the good traits of moral agents. The more perfect the
moral agent, the more perfect the virtues. God is both a moral agent and
a perfect being. Therefore, God has perfectly good moral traits- perfect
virtues. Like all moral agents, God has motives, where motives are both
explanations of and justifications for an agent's acts. In humans motives
become dispositions, but if God has no dispositions, then God's motives
are always in act, and God is always acting upon them. Since God is the
perfect agent, God's motives are the perfect motives. God's love is the
perfect motive of love; God's compassion is the perfect motive of compassion; God's mercy is the perfect motive of mercy, and so on. Since
compassion, love, mercy, etc. are emotions, God's compassion, love,
mercy, etc. are perfect emotions. I am not suggesting that it necessarily
follows from the fact that God acts from compassion, and that the state
of compassion in humans is an emotion, that God has emotions. I do
think that having emotions is part of what makes a being a moral agent.
But the minimum I want to insist upon in this paper is that God's
virtues, like our virtues, include a component of motivation- a state
that is act-directing, as well as reliable success in bringing about the aim
of the motive. God's motives are perfect, and his success is perfect as
well. God is, therefore, not just reliable, he is perfectly reliable. A divine
virtue, then, is the combination of a perfect motive with perfect success
in bringing about the end of the motive.'6
Reply to objection 1: An emotion is a state of consciousness of a certain
kind. I have suggested that that state includes a cognitive aspect whereby the emotion's intentional object is understood or construed to be a
certain way. But an emotion is also an affective state; it has a certain
"feel". No~ the fact that God has no body precludes God from having
emotions only if the possession of a body is a necessary condition for the
states of consciousness in question, and that, of course, is denied by the
Cartesian view on the relation between mind and body. Furthermore,
even if Aquinas is right that sensory experience necessarily requires a
body, it is not obvious that emotions necessarily have a sensory component if we mean by "sensory" a state that is of the same kind as states of
consciousness that arise from the five senses or that are localized, such
as the sensation of pain. But suppose we grant the objection. Suppose
we agree with Aquinas that God has no passions (passiones) since these
belong to the sensory appetite and the sensory appetite requires a body.
Aquinas agrees that God does have affectiones since the latter admits of
two kinds, sensory and intellective. God has intellective appetites which
belong to the will. In this category are included states that we call emo-
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tions, states such as love and joy. We see, then, that there are two words
that refer to affective states in Aquinas, "passiones" and "affectioncs."
"Passiones" may be translated "passion" or "emotion," whereas Norman
Kretzmann suggests "attitudes" as the translation for "affectioncs."17 As
Kretzmann translates Aquinas, then, God has certain "attitudes" of love
and joy, but these states are not emotions since Kretzmann maintains
that Aquinas maintains that God has no emotions. But a case could be
made for translating "affectiones" as "emotions" if it is true that even in
us, states of emotion are not necessarily sensory. If some of our emotions
are, or could be, intellective affectiones this would mean that the sensory
aspect of an emotion is not essential to a state's being one of emotion. If
so, a state could not be denied the categorization of an emotion on the
grounds that it is not a sensory state. Thus, even if God has no sensory
states it would not follow that he has no emotions.
Objection 1 gives a second reason for thinking that God cannot have
emotions and that is that emotions are passions, ways of being acted
upon, and thereby imply lack of perfection. r will not here address the
issue of whether emotions are necessarily passive, but I do want to raise
the question of whether emotion is an intrinsically defective state, a state
that only makes sense when attributed to defective beings. I do not see
that there is anything about emotion per se that implies imperfection,
although there is no doubt that there are particular emotions that do
have such an implication- e.g., fear, hope, jealousy, envy, hatred, bitterness. I hesitate to say that sadness implies a defect since sadness need
not require any lack in the agent who has the emotion since it is a
response to defects outside of the agent. The issue of whether the agent
who has a certain emotion is defective does not correspond to the distinction that is sometimes made between positive and negative emotions. Some negative emotions such as sadness may imply no defect,
whereas some positive emotions such as hope probably do imply a
defect. This means that while God does have emotions, he does not have
the range of emotions that human beings have.
r have already said that it is not necessary to accept that Cod has emotions for the argument of this paper in spite of what r have said in this
reply. Even if God does not have emotions, God nonetheless has states
that are the counterparts of the states which in us are emotions. God has
emotions in at least the same sense that God has beliefs. God's emotions
may not be just like ours, but God's cognitive states are not just like ours
either. What is of particular importance for Divine Motivation Theory is
not so much that God's emotions are similar to ours in the way they feel,
but that the divine states which are the counterparts of human emotions
are motivations. That much should not be controversial. Since God is a
moral agent, God acts from motives, and among those motives are compassion, forgiveness, and love.
Reply to objection 2: As Norman Kretzmann has pointed out to me,
while Aquinas says that virtue is a habit, "habitus" to Aquinas means
fundamentally the same thing as "having." The dispositional aspect of a
habitus is important in his account of human virtues and vices because of
our temporality and imperfection, but the idea of a disposition or habit
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is not essential to a habitus as Aquinas means it and does not prevent
God from having qualities that in us would be habits or dispositions. For
example, knowledge is a habitus and most human knowledge is dispositional. But the fact that God has no dispositions does not prevent God
from having knowledge, nor does it prevent God's knowledge from
being a habitus since God's knowledge is the eternal having of all truths.
Similarly, even though a virtue such as compassion is a habitus which in
us requires development over time culminating in a disposition distinctive of the virtue of compassion, that does not prevent God from having
compassion, nor does it prevent compassion in God from being a habitus. God eternally has the emotion of compassion, not just as a disposition, but as an eternal motive-in-act.
Reply to objection 3: If a natural kind is a species, then God is not a natural kind, although God does have a nature and God is a certain kind of
thing, namely, Absolutely Perfect Being, or Necessarily Existent Being.
Each of the traditional arguments for the existence of God identifies a
kind of thing that must be God, a kind of thing which, it must be argued,
can have only one member. The divine virtues express the perfections of
the kind God. There is no potency in God, but we can see that there is
nothing inconsistent in the claim that a being with no potency has
virtues since if, per impossibile, a human being reached full actualization
of her potential with respect to some virtue, say, compassion, we certainly would not on that account deny that she is compassionate. The way in
which a virtue is acquired is not essential to the virtue itself, although it
may be essential to beings with a human nature to acquire virtue in a
certain way. This means that there is nothing good for God if that means
an extrinsic good that God needs for actualization, but there is still a
sense in which God's virtues are good for him since even in the human
case we do not cease claiming that what is good for us is good for us
once it is attained. It is good for a human to have knowledge even when
the knowledge is possessed; it is good for a knife to be sharp even when
it is sharp. And it is good for God to be perfectly just, merciful, etc. 1M
Reply to objection 4: This is not an objection to the claim that God has
virtues, nor even to the theoretical usefulness of understanding human
moral properties in terms of God's virtues, but to the practical relevance
of the claim for moral education and training. An answer to this objection would require a demonstration of the way the idea of a virtuous
God can be integrated into the biblical doctrine of imitatio Dei. That issue
will be addressed in the next section.
IV. Divine Motivation Theory

Motivation-based virtue theory is a very general form of pure virtue
ethics in which motivational states are the most basic bearers of moral
value and the moral properties of persons, acts, and states of affairs are
defined in terms of the goodness and badness of motives. I outlined the
way to give these definitions in section II. Divine Motivation Theory
makes the motives of one being in particular the primary bearer of
moral value, and that is God. The complete theory can still make the
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goodness of human motives the primary bearer of moral value in a universe of human persons, human acts, and the states of affai~rs encountered by human beings. But the goodness of human motives needs to be
explained since we humans are quite clearly imperfect in our nature and
the goodness of our motives is never pure.
God has such virtues as justice, benevolence, mercy, forgiveness,
kindness, love, compassion, loyalty, generosity, trustworthiness, integrity, and wisdom. God does not have courage, temperance, chastity, piety,
nor perhaps humility, nor does he have faith or hope. Each of the virtues
in the latter group involve handling emotions that are distinctive of limited and embodied creatures like ourselves. Sexual feelings make no
sense when applied to a disembodied being, and since God does not
have to deal with fear, the awareness of inferiority to a superior being,
the sense of powerlessness, nor the need for faith in God, which is to
say, himself, it does not make sense to say that God has the virtues in
this category. This means that God's virtues correspond to only some of
the traits we consider human virtues. Of course, it does not follow that
God's virtues are limited to these traits. It would be presumptuous of us
to think that all divine virtues are perfections of human traits. If there
are angels, God's virtues no doubt include perfections of angelic virtues,
and if there are any other moral creatures in existence, God's virtues
would include the perfections of the virtues of those beings as well. This
position is expressed by Aquinas as follows:
For just as God's being is universally perfect, in some way or other
containing within itself the perfection of all beings, so also must his
goodness in some way or other contain within itself the goodness
of all things. Now a virtue is a goodness belonging to a virtuous
person, for "it is in accordance with it that one is called good, and
what one does is called good" [NE 1106a22-4]. Therefore, in its own
way the divine goodness must contain all virtues. (SCG I. 92.768).19
But how are we to understand what it means for God to "contain" all
the virtues, even those I have already agreed God does not havevirtues like chastity, humility, and courage? And how can the virtues
God does have give us any practical guidance in the moral life? The
answer, I suggest, is that we humans ought to think of Divine
Motivation Theory in conjunction with the doctrines of the Trinity and
the Incarnation. The arguments in natural theology about the nature of
God do not pertain to Christ, the Incarnate Son of God. Christ did have
the virtues of chastity, humility, and courage, as well as all the other
virtues humans ought to develop, so the virtues of Christ are "contained" in the nature of God in the way that Christ is contained in God
according to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Tl-ds means
that these important Christian doctrines have a special place in the metaphysics of Christian morals. The Incarnation also helps us to resolve the
practical problem of how we learn to be moral since we are called to
develop the virtues by the imitation of Christ.
The idea that humans should become as much like God as is humanly
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possible is the basis of the primary ethical doctrine of the Hebrew Bible, that
of imitatio Dei. 20 "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy" (Lev.
19:2) To become like God is to follow God's commands: "The Lord will
establish you for a holy people unto Himself, as He has sworn unto you; if
you shall keep the commandments of the Lord your God, and walk in His
ways." (Deut 28: 9). The focus of Christian ethics, in contrast, is less on following divine commands than on imitating the virtues of Christ, and the
focus of the New Testament is primarily on the motivational component of
these virtues. We see Jesus in a variety of human circumstances that produce
recognizable human emotions, including temptation, weariness, anxiety,
sadness, and anger. Jesus makes very few commands, but when he does, his
injunctions generally call us to have motivations (emotion-dispositions)
which I claim are the basic components of virtues, as in the Beatitudes and
the two great commandments of love. The New Testament does not typically call us to will, but to be motivated in a virtuous way, so St. Paul says,
"Owe no one anything but to love one another" (Romans 13:8). The Golden
Rule appeals to a motive, not to a volition. We imagine how we would want
to be treated and imaginatively project our own wants onto others. This
leads us to have an emotional response to other persons that motivates our
treatment of them. Our motive for loving and forgiving is not that we are to
follow God's commands, but that God himself loves and forgives. And we
see that there is no limit on the forgiveness of injuries because it corresponds
to God's forgiveness of us, not because it will win over the offender or
because God wills it (Matt18:21ff). The same point applies to the call "Be perfect even as your heavenly father is perfect." (Matt 5:48).
Many Christian ethicists have worked on basing ethics on the imitation of Christ. Much of this work uses the narrative approach to ethics,
and my purpose is not to duplicate it, but to show how this approach
can be combined with the theoretical structure I have outlined here to
produce a theory that is both theoretically powerful and practically useful. In addition to narrative ethics, many Christian ethicists have produced careful and subtle elucidations of the individual virtues based on
Scripture and the Christian tradition of veneration of the saints. Here
also I neither intend nor am able to duplicate this work which has, in
any case, been done very well by others, but to show how the philosopher's theoretical urge can be formulated in a way that combines naturally with these other approaches to Christian ethics.

V. Advantages of DM theory over DC theory
Divine Motivation Theory is structurally parallel to Divine Command
Theory in that DM theory makes moral properties derivative from God's
motives, whereas DC theory makes moral properties derivative from
God's will. In this section I will briefly compare the two theories to
show how DM theory avoids the well-known problems of DC theory
and has some decided advantages.
Divine Command theory makes the divine will the source of moral
value. Roughly, good stat~s of affairs are what God wills to exist; bad
states of affairs are what God wills not to exist. The focus of the theory,
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however, is generally on the rightness and wrongness of human acts. An
act is morally required (a duty) just in case God commands us to do it;
an act is morally wrong just in case God forbids us to do it. Since a
divine command is the expression of God's will with respect to human
and other creaturely acts, the divine will is the fundamental source of
the moral properties of acts as well as of states of affairs.
The nature of the relation between God's commands and moral
requirements is an important issue for DC theorists. To say that "x is
morally required" just means "x is commanded by God" is too strong
since that has the consequence that to say !Ix is right because God commands it" is a mere tautology; it is just to say /Ix is commanded by God
because x is commanded by God." On the other hand, to say that God's
commands and moral requirements are extensionally equivalent is too
weak. That is compatible with the lack of any metaphysical connection
whatever between the existence of moral properties and God's will. The
DC theory, then, aims at something in between identity of meaning and
mere extensional equivalence. It should turn out that God's will makes
what's good to be good and what's right to be right. States of affairs are
good/bad and acts are right/wrong because of the will of God. God's
will is the metaphysical ground of all moral properties. This is also the
sense in which God's motives ground moral value in DM theory.
An important objection to Divine Command theory goes back to Plato's
Euthyphro where Socrates asks, "Is what is holy holy because the gods
approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" (10a). As applied to DC
theory this question produces a famous dilemma: If God wills the good
because it is good, then goodness is independent of God's will and the latter
does not explain the former. On the other hand, if something is good because
God wills it, then it looks as if the divine will is arbitrary. God is not constrained by any moral reason from willing anything whatever, and it is hard
to see how any non-moral reason could be the right sort of reason to determine God's choice of what to make good or bad. The apparent consequence
is that good/bad and right/wrong are determined by an arbitrary divine
will; God could have commanded cruelty or hatred, and if he had done so,
cruel and hateful acts would have been right, even duties. This is not only an
unacceptable consequence for our sense of the essentiality of the moral properties of acts of certain kinds, but it also makes it hard to see how it can be
true that God himself is good in any important, substantive sense of good.
Robert Adams has attempted to address this problem by modifying
DC theory to say that the property of rightness is the property of being
commanded by a loving God. This permits Adams to allow that God
could command cruelty for its own sake, but if God did so he would not
love us, says Adams, and if that were the case, he argues, morality
would break down. Morality is dependent upon divine commands, but
they are dependent upon the commands of a deity with a certain nature.
If God's nature were not loving, morality would fall aparFI
But even if Adams's proposal succeeds at answering the objection it is
designed to address, it seems to me that it is unsatisfactory because it is ad
hoc. There is no intrinsic connection between a command and the property of
being loving, so to tie morality to the commands of a loving God is to tie it to
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two distinct properties of God. In OM theory, however, there is no need to
solve the problem of whether God could make it right that we brutalize the
innocent by making any such modification to the theory since being loving is
one of God's essential motives. The right thing for humans to do is to act on
motives that imitate the divine motives. Brutalizing the innocent is not an act
that expresses a motive that imitates the divine motives. Hence, it is impossible for brutalizing the innocent to be right as long as (i) it is impossible for
such an act to be an expression of a motive that is like the motives of God,
and (ii) it is impossible for God to have different motives. (ii) follows from
the highly plausible assumption that God's motives are part of his nature.
DC theory also can argue that God's will is part of his nature, and
Stump and Kretzmann have used the Thomistic doctrine of divine simplicity, which has the consequence that God's will is identical with his
nature, to solve both the arbitrariness problem and the problem that God
could command something like cruelty.22 This solution is not ad hoc, but it
requires argument to make the needed connection between the divine will
and the divine nature. That is because a will is logically separable from its
possessor in a way that motives are not. In fact, the feature of a will that
led to the theory of the existence of a will in the first place, namely, its
freedom, is the very feature that seems to have that consequence. In contrast, God's love, mercy, justice, compassion, etc., make God what he is.
There is no need to overcome by argument a prior expectation that God's
motives are dissociated from his nature as in the case of God's commands.
The arbitariness problem mayor may not be answerable in a DC theory,
but the problem does not even arise in OM theory. That is because a will
needs a reason, but a motive is a reason. The will, according to Aquinas,
always chooses "under the aspect of good," which means that reasons are
not inherent in the will itself. In contrast, motives provide not only the impetus to action, but the reason for the action. If we know that God acts from a
motive of love there is no need to look for a further reason for the act. On the
other hand, a divine command requires a reason, and if the reason is or
includes fundamental divine motivational states such as love, it follows that
even DC theory needs to refer to God's motives to avoid the consequence
that moral properties are arbitrary and God himself is not good. This move
makes divine motives more basic than the divine will even in DC theory.
Aside from DC's difficulty with these objections, Divine Motivation
theory has an important theoretical advantage. OM theory gives us a unitary theory of all evaluative properties, divine as well as human, whereas
DC theory does not. DC theory is most naturally interpreted as an ethics
of law, a divine deontological theory, wherein the content of the law is
promulgated by divine commands. God's own goodness and the rightness of God's own acts, however, are not connected to divine commands.
In contrast, OM theory makes the features of the divine nature in virtue of
which God is morally good the foundation for the moral goodness of
those same features in creatures. Both divine and human goodness are
explained in terms of good motives, and the goodness of human motives
is derived from the goodness of the divine motives. OM theory, then, is a
virtue theory that applies to both divine and human moral properties.
We have already seen another feature of OM theory that gives it an
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advantage over DC theory, and that is that DM theory shows the importance of Christology for ethics, whereas DC theory does not. DC theory
ignores the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, focusing on the
will of the Creator-God as the source of moral value. It is, in effect, an
Old Testament theory. The features of Christian ethics that derive from
the life of Christ do not appear in the theory, at least not in any straightforward way. The fact that DM theory integrates these features into the
theory makes it theologically preferable as well as easier to apply.
Elsewhere I have argued that DM theory, like DC theory, has the
resources to solve some important puzzles in natural theology: the paradoxes of perfect goodness and the logical problem of evil.23 I will not
review these arguments here, but if they work, they point to an advantage that both DM and DC theory have over other theories. If DM theory
also has the advantages over DC theory I have mentioned here, that suggests that a strong case could be made for DM theory. I will undertake a
full defense of the theory in a longer project,24
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such is a concept of the type listed above. These concepts are or include what
Bernard Williams calls thick ethical concepts, but I will not discuss this part of
my theory of emotion here. T pursue that question in "Emotion and Moral
Judgment," in progress.
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that all morally significant motives are emotions. Tdoubt that it is an exception,
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virtue or vice itself. This is probably the case with courage and cowardice, fairness and unfairness. On the other hand, sometimes the word for the virtue or
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"would" that appears in Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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